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Introduction 
The two papers by Bobes, Lopera, Garcia, Diaz-Comas, Galan and Valdes-
Sosa (2003, this issue) and by Sperber and Spinnler (2003, this issue) add to the large 
body of literature demonstrating covert face recognition in prosopagnosia. This 
viewpoint will offer some perspectives on this interesting phenomenon. First, a re-
analysis of the empirical literature will indicate an important misconception concerning 
the preserved abilities of prosopagnosics. The second section will briefly assess the 
contribution of Bobes et al. (2003, this issue) and Sperber and Spinnler (2003, this 
issue) to the debate about the locus, in cognitive terms, of the underlying causal deficit 
in prosopagnosia with covert face recognition. Both papers make reference to the two 
main models seeking to explain this phenomenon: the model proposed by Burton and 
colleagues (Burton et al., 1991; Burton and Young, 1999; Young and Burton, 1999) 
and that proposed by Farah and colleagues (Farah et al., 1993; O’Reilly and Farah, 
1999). Finally, an observation will be offered concerning representations of faces in the 
Burton et al. (1991) model.  
Re-analysis of the literature  
Both Bobes et al. (2003, this issue) and Sperber and Spinnler (2003, this issue) 
state that their participant performed at chance in a task of deciding which of two 
simultaneously presented faces was familiar; every trial presented one familiar and 
one unfamiliar face. Failure in this task is central to the definition of prosopagnosia, 
that is the inability to gain a sense of familiarity to a known face. Other investigations of 
densely prosopagnosic participants (see Table I) have reported failure in this task. 
However, participant FE (Bobes et al.) scored 10/16 = 62.5 % correct and participant 
Emma (Sperber and Spinnler) scored 19/36 = 52.8% correct. No analysis of power 
was reported in either case, leaving open the possibility that a test with a sufficient 
number of trials would have yielded performance better than chance.  
A review of the literature, presented in Table I, shows that the majority of 
densely prosopagnosic participants (9/10) scored above 50% correct in this task. For 
illustration, a one-sample t-test with the chance level of performance set at 50% gives 
a statistically significant result, t (9) = 2.07, p < 0.04 (one-tailed), mean = 55.5, s.d. = 
8.4. The criterion for inclusion in this analysis was that the participant should be unable 
to gain any subjective sense of familiarity, and unable to provide any semantic 
information, from visual inspection of the faces of all or virtually all famous people and 
family members. Thus all the participants had total or near total failure at the early 
stage of overt familiarity detection as well as the subsequent stage of retrieval of face-
related information. To this extent they present a homogeneous group of participants. 
Although performance is still severely impaired, and is only just above chance, it may 
have been premature to conclude that densely prosopagnosic participants cannot 
detect familiarity in a direct test. Such conclusion relies on acceptance of the null 
hypothesis and this is particularly problematic without an analysis of power.  
Table 1: Percent correct in the task of deciding which of two simultaneously presented 
faces is familiar; every trial presented one familiar and one unfamiliar face.  
Source Case Percent correct 
Bobes et al. (2003)  FE  63 
de Haan, Bauer and Greve (1992)  LF  51 
de Haan, Young and Newcombe (1992)  NR  75 
Diamond, Valentine, Mayes and Sandel (1994) ET  53 
Newcombe, Young and de Haan (1989)  MS  53 
Sergent and Signoret (1992)  PC  44 
 PM  54 
 RM  58 
Sperber and Spinnler (2003)  Emma  53 
Young and de Haan (1988)  PH  51 
Note: participants were described as follows: FE “dense prosopagnosia” (p. 9 of 
manuscript), LF “completely unable to identify familiar people from visual inspection of 
their faces” (p. 80), NR “identification of familiar faces, whether by naming them or 
giving appropriate semantic information, was virtually impossible” (p. 147), ET “inability 
to recognise faces that ought to be familiar” (p. 380), MS “completely unable to 
recognise familiar faces” (p. 180), PC, PM and RM “severe prosopagnosic” (p. 389), 
Emma “completely bereft of overt face recognition” (p. 13 of manuscript), PH 
“completely unable to recognise familiar faces overtly” (p. 320).  
The performance of participant PH in two-alternative forced-choice tasks of 
occupation decision (Young, 1998) is also informative. When required to select the 
politician from a pair of faces comprising one politician and one TV personality, with 
the faces matched on visual characteristics, performance was 55.6% correct. When 
required to perform a similar task with just 10 faces repeated 20 times, PH achieved 
52% correct. When asked to decide whether faces belonged to members of the 
research team or not, PH scored 50% and 56.25% in two repetitions of the task. 
Although none of these individual results differs from chance in a binomial test, a one-
sample t-test on the set of results is very near significance, t (3) = 2.33, p = 0.051 (one-
tailed), mean = 53.46, s.d. = 2.97. The implication is that it may be unwise to draw a 
conclusion from a single task, and participant PH may be able to detect occupation in a 
direct test.  
In the light of the suggestion of partially preserved covert familiarity detection it 
is relevant to examine whether the reported simulations indicate this ability (Burton and 
Young, 1999; Farah et al., 1993; O’Reilly and Farah, 1999; Young and Burton, 1999). 
It appears that neither simulation clearly demonstrates above chance performance in 
two-alternative forced-choice tasks of familiarity detection. In the Farah et al. (1993) 
simulation it is proposed that familiarity may be detected from faster settling into a 
stable pattern of activation in the case of familiar compared to unfamiliar faces. 
However, the reported simulations show that the settling speed is similar for familiar 
and unfamiliar faces at levels of damage where other covert recognition effects are still 
apparent (p. 52). This does not clearly simulate the apparent preserved capabilities of 
prosopagnosic participants. Turning to the Burton et al. (1991) model, overt familiarity 
is signalled by a level of activation at the person identity node (PIN) above a given, 
arbitrary threshold. Burton and Young (1999) specifically state that there is no 
mechanism whereby performance in a two-alternative forced-choice test of familiarity 
can be influenced by a level of activation at the PIN that is below threshold for 
conscious familiarity detection but above the resting level. “Indeed, as we explicitly 
discuss in our original article (pp. 18-19) it is a defining characteristic of the model that 
there is no access to below-threshold activation for the decision mechanism” (p. 78). 
Thus it appears that both models would require modification to reflect the probable true 
abilities of prosopagnosics in this regard.  
There is another intriguing possibility: that familiarity detection may be based on 
affective valence rather than on familiarity per se. Greve and Bauer (1990) presented 
their prosopagnosic participant with pairs of unfamiliar faces, such that in each pair 
one face had been studied in an earlier phase of the experiment and the other had not. 
When the task was to select the preferred face, the previously studied face was 
selected on around 70% of trials. This is easy to interpret in terms of the mere 
exposure effect (Zajonc, 1980; see Zajonc, 2001, for a review) which proposes that a 
familiar item is preferred over an unfamiliar item. In contrast, accuracy was only 53%, 
not significantly above chance, when presented with the explicit task of selecting the 
previously studied face. It seems that accuracy was superior in a preference decision 
compared to a familiarity decision. This raises the possibility that performance in the 
familiarity decision is in fact based on preference. Consider a participant with no 
subjective sense of familiarity to any seen face, who is presented with two faces and 
asked to pick the previously studied one. The participant has no consciously 
accessible knowledge on which to base the decision and must guess. It seems 
plausible that the participant might pick the face in each pair for which there is a 
preference, whatever the basis for the preference. An explicit preference decision 
enables the same information to be used more effectively.  
The Greve and Bauer (1990) task involved unfamiliar faces, for which only their 
exposure in the study phase could have generated the participant’s preference. For 
famous faces, however, the situation is quite different, as there is specific knowledge 
from which an affective attitude towards the person can be derived. Stone et al. (2001, 
Experiment 3) presented famous faces one at a time to unimpaired participants, for 
17ms with forward and backward masking preventing conscious recognition. 
Performance was above chance in a two-alternative forced-choice of “good” versus 
“evil”, defined by the participants’ own subsequent ratings, suggesting that affective 
attitude can influence responses to subjectively unknown faces. In a two-alternative 
forced-choice task of deciding which of two simultaneously presented faces was 
famous, the prosopagnosic participant (NR) studied by de Haan, Young and 
Newcombe (1992) consistently chose a subset of the famous faces over several 
repetitions of the task. At the same time NR had no subjective sense of familiarity to 
these faces. It is possible that NR’s performance was mediated by a positive affective 
attitude towards these target individuals. It is also possible that other prosopagnosics 
might show a similar consistency if repeatedly presented with the same stimuli.  
To summarise, there is evidence to suggest that affective valence can influence 
responses to subjectively unknown faces. This could be a fruitful line of research.  
Sperber and Spinnler 
Sperber and Spinnler (2003, this issue) document the disappearance of one 
form of covert face recognition, the true face-name relearning advantage (e.g. Bruyer 
et al., 1983; see Young, 1998 for a review), in a patient suffering from a degenerative 
loss of person semantics. The authors point out that this was not prosopagnosia as 
such, since the deficit in overt person recognition extended to other modalities (e.g. 
voice and name), and unique person information could not be consciously retrieved via 
any means. Emma could recognise the names of some celebrities whose faces she 
deemed unfamiliar, suggesting additional impairment of face recognition as well as the 
loss of person semantics. This is plausible given that Emma’s temporal lobe 
degeneration was particularly apparent in the right hemisphere.  
Sperber and Spinnler suggest that the true face-name relearning advantage 
observed at the first testing session, with no overt face recognition, implies that person 
semantics were still accessible but could not be activated to a degree sufficient to 
enable conscious retrieval by the perception of a known face. The Burton et al. (1991) 
and the Farah et al. (1993) models both account for covert face recognition in 
prosopagnosia as the residual functioning of a system that is damaged but not 
completely obliterated. Tests of covert face recognition are more sensitive to the 
weakened activation present in a damaged system and hence can be detected in the 
absence of overt face recognition. The explanation offered by Sperber and Spinnler is 
clearly the same kind of explanation as those offered by Burton et al. (1991) and Farah 
et al. (1993): partial activation in a damaged but not obliterated system. It is worth 
noting, as pointed out by Young and Ellis (2000), that both models would be seriously 
challenged by an instance of failure to find any form of covert face recognition in the 
presence of only moderate prosopagnosia. No such case has yet been reported.  
Sperber and Spinnler (2003, this issue) add to the literature by extending the 
observation of true face-name relearning advantage to a participant with a qualitatively 
different kind of deficit, the loss of person semantics. The paper adds weight to the 
argument that the same phenomenon of covert face recognition can be due to more 
than one underlying cause.  
Bobes, Lopera, Garcia, Diaz-Comas, Galan and Valdes-Sosa 
Bobes et al. (2003, this issue) report ERP data from a prosopagnosic 
participant, FE, impaired in the overt sequential matching of 2 photographs of a 
previously unfamiliar face when these differed in emotional expression. Yet the ERP 
data distinguished between match and mismatch trials with the same latency as an 
age-matched control group, suggesting dissociation between overt and covert 
performance in this task. The authors suggest that FE presents normal early face 
perception and a normal availability of face structural codes. This contradicts the Farah 
et al. (1993) model of covert face recognition in prosopagnosia, which predicts that 
there will always be impairment of early face perception. Bobes et al. (2003, this issue) 
refer to the Burton (1994) model incorporating a learning mechanism, in which weak 
and temporary face recognition units (FRUs) are formed for new faces. The weak and 
temporary FRU created for the first face in each pair could enable the covert detection 
of mismatch. The authors “speculate that activation of PINs, or other nodes…, are 
necessary for the explicit encoding of face information into working memory which 
would enable overt matching”. Thus it is suggested that the deficit in overt sequential 
matching of unfamiliar faces may stem from the same underlying cause as the deficit 
in overt familiar face recognition: damage to connections between intact FRUs and 
PINs.  
Relevant to the “explicit encoding of face information into working memory” is 
the investigation of face imagery reported by Cabeza et al. (1997). They proposed the 
existence of two separate links between FRUs and PINs: the link from the FRU to the 
PIN supports recognition, while the link from the PIN to the FRU supports imagery 
(face recall). The results reported by De Renzi and Pellegrino (1998) and by Takahashi 
et al. (1995) are compatible with this interpretation. In regards to Bobes et al. (2003, 
this issue), access to the first face in a pair could be achieved via the PIN, linking to 
the FRU in order to encode into working memory an image of the first face for 
comparison with the second face. If the link from the PIN to the FRU were damaged 
but not obliterated then this process would be somewhat impaired, which could result 
in the covert but not overt sequential matching of unfamiliar faces.  
This account clearly supports the Burton et al. (1991) account of covert face 
recognition in prosopagnosia rather than the Farah et al. (1993) model. However, there 
is an alternative explanation. The faces in each pair were presented for 1000 ms each 
with no inter-stimulus interval. The immediate presentation of the second face allows 
the possibility that the structural representation of the first face was held in working 
memory and never established as a stored record. There is therefore insufficient 
evidence to establish that FRUs were created. In addition, Bobes et al. noted that “The 
general morphology of the ERPs in FE is somewhat different to the grand average of 
the control group, specially due to the presence of a larger N170 at posterior and 
temporal sites”. This suggests that the early processes of face perception may not 
have been entirely normal in FE, and is consistent with the Farah et al. (1993) model.  
An additional consideration is the contradiction between Bobes et al. (2003) and 
Bobes et al. (1999). The earlier paper also reported the results of an ERP study of 
participant FE but reached the contrasting conclusion that FRUs were impaired. The 
discrepancy may be resolved by considering that the task presented by Bobes et al. 
(1999) relied on face structural information held in long-term memory, whereas the 
task presented by Bobes et al. (2003, this issue) did not. This permits an alternative 
account, as follows. Participant FE is impaired both in the process of constructing a 
structural representation of a perceived face and in the long-term storage of face 
records. The achievement of an impaired representation of an unfamiliar face explains 
covert success and overt failure in the immediate sequential matching of unfamiliar 
faces. Impairment to the store of face records explains covert and overt failure in the 
task of Bobes et al. (1999) that required long-term storage. This implies damage to 
early face perception and to the stage of storing structural face representations and is 
thus consistent with the Farah et al. (1993) model.  
One point that must be made is that interpretation of tasks involving unfamiliar 
faces in terms of models of familiar face recognition necessitates the assumption that 
unfamiliar and familiar faces are processed by the same system. If this is not the case 
then any data on unfamiliar face matching is uninformative about prosopagnosia. For 
example, a sequential matching task on unfamiliar faces (e.g. Bobes et al., 2003, this 
issue) might rely only on the structural encoding stage and some other system 
involving the temporary storage of an abstract structural record of an unfamiliar face. 
Note that structural encoding must be a common stage for familiar and unfamiliar faces 
since it is only after this stage that a face can be categorised as familiar.  
It should be made clear quite what is meant by saying that familiar and 
unfamiliar faces are “processed in the same system”. The processing involved in 
unfamiliar faces requires that a structural record of the face is created and stored so 
that it can be accessed in future, with the attachment of minimal semantic information 
detailing the situation in which the face has been encountered. No other semantic 
information is available for an unfamiliar face.  
While there is evidence of double dissociation of impairment between the 
processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces (e.g. Parry et al., 1991; Young et al., 1993; 
see e.g. Bruce and Young, 1998; Hancock et al., 2000, for reviews) this does not 
suffice to establish that separate cognitive systems are involved. It is important to note 
that different tasks are used to investigate the processing of familiar and unfamiliar 
faces. Typically, unfamiliar faces are presented in a task of simultaneous or sequential 
matching of same or different views of the same face, or in a task of deciding whether 
or not an unfamiliar face was presented during an earlier study phase. At most, 
unfamiliar faces must be remembered for an hour or two. Familiar faces, in contrast, 
are presented for familiarity decision or retrieval of information about the target 
individual (e.g. Bruce and Young, 1998) and this demands that a face be remembered 
over a much longer period. Therefore tasks performed on familiar and unfamiliar faces 
do not place equivalent demands on memory. There is evidence that prosopagnosics 
have the ability to remember faces for the duration of an experiment but not for longer 
periods. Several researchers (de Haan et al., 1987; 1991; Diamond et al., 1994; 
McNeil and Warrington, 1991; Schweinberger et al., 1995; Sergent and Poncet, 1990; 
Sergent and Signoret, 1992; Young and de Haan, 1988) have demonstrated that face-
name and face-occupation pairings can be learned after several repetitions. This 
shows that a face can be overtly associated with a name or an occupation for short 
time. However, this learning is only temporary, or prosopagnosia would be a transient 
condition. If there is impairment to the long term storage of structural face records, 
unfamiliar face processing may be relatively preserved in a task requiring that the face 
records be stored only temporarily (for the duration of an experiment) while familiar 
face recognition is severely impaired.  
Another difference concerns the quality of representation required for the 
recognition of familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces. Hancock et al. (2000) 
review evidence that familiar faces can be recognised from very poor quality 
photographs, while unfamiliar faces cannot. If there is impairment to the structural 
encoding stage, conceptually equivalent to a poor quality photograph, then processing 
of unfamiliar faces may be severely impaired, while the recognition of familiar faces 
and recall of semantic information can still be achieved with substantial success.  
The observation in some prosopagnosics of relatively preserved processing of 
unfamiliar faces combined with severe impairment of familiar face recognition, and the 
opposite pattern in other participants, may be partially due to the unequal difficulty of 
the tasks typically employed. Hence the observed double dissociation of performance 
deficits between the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces does not constitute 
evidence of separate cognitive systems. The principle of parsimony suggests that a 
single system for processing familiar and unfamiliar faces should be assumed in the 
absence of strong evidence to the contrary. To show how this might work, Burton 
(1994) describes and simulates a process for face learning that implicates only one 
system.  
An observation on the Burton et al model 
The Burton et al. (1991) model contains two representations of names: the 
name input units subserving recognition, and the name semantic units subserving 
recall. The relative difficulty of name recall compared to name recognition is accounted 
for by the extra step required to access the name semantic unit for name recall. A 
similar empirical phenomenon applies also to faces, that is recognition is easier than 
recall, assuming face imagery to be the equivalent of face recall (e.g. Cabeza et al., 
1997). Yet the same Burton et al. (1991) model, enhanced in Cabeza et al. (1997), 
represents structural information about a face only once, in the FRU. A single store of 
structural information about faces is supported by fMRI evidence (e.g. O’Craven and 
Kanwisher, 2000) and by behavioural data (e.g. Cabeza et al., 1997; Michelon and 
Koenig, 2002) suggesting that face perception and face imagery share common 
representations and processing mechanisms (see Kosslyn, 1994; 1995 for reviews). 
Cabeza et al. (1997) account for the superiority of face recognition over recall by two 
separate links between FRU and PIN such that the link from FRU to PIN subserving 
face recognition is more easily activated than the link from PIN to FRU subserving 
recall.  
An even more parsimonious account has only one link between FRU and PIN. 
The superiority of face recognition over recall can be understood by observing that 
recognition requires access from the complex code specifying the structure of the face 
to a single entry, the PIN, whereas recall requires access from the PIN to reconstruct 
the complex code. It seems plausible that the former is easier than the latter. The 
results of Cabeza et al. (1997) that were interpreted as implying two separate links 
between FRU and PIN may in fact be consistent with a single link, with the additional 
observation that their perceptual and imagery tasks seem likely to have used different 
subsets of the information stored in the FRU. The perception of very familiar faces is 
likely to have concentrated on internal features whereas imagery, a harder task, may 
have concentrated on more readily imaged aspects of a face such as external features 
(e.g. hair) and distinguishing marks.  
At a simple level it would seem that the superiority of face recognition over face 
imagery may be explained either by the existence of two separate links between FRU 
and PIN, or by one link with access in two directions. A relevant consideration is the 
principle of parsimony at the level of neural implementation, and it seems probable that 
the most efficient implementation would be a single link. Perhaps detailed theoretical 
and empirical consideration could be given to this question.  
Returning to names, Valentine et al. (1996) proposed a single lexical store. This 
was supported by the results of two experiments (Valentine et al., 1998; replicated by 
Hollis and Valentine, 2001) that cannot be explained in the Burton et al. (1991) model. 
The Valentine et al. (1996) model did, however, retain separate input and output stores 
for phonological representations of names. It is also interesting that part of the debate 
between Burton and colleagues (Burton et al., 1991; Burton and Young, 1999; Young 
and Burton, 1999) and Farah and colleagues (Farah et al., 1993; O’Reilly and Farah, 
1999) concerned the question of a single representation of names versus separate 
representations for input and output. Perhaps consideration could be given to the 
possibility of moving towards a single lexical store of names, along the lines of a single 
store of face structural representations.  
Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this Viewpoint that challenge the 
prevailing views of prosopagnosia and models of face recognition. First, a level of 
familiarity detection not significantly better than chance in a single case study does not 
necessarily serve to establish the complete absence of preserved ability, and it 
appears that densely prosopagnosic participants may have some covert ability to 
detect familiarity in a direct test. Second, the question of facial familiarity detection in 
prosopagnosia has been posed in terms of familiarity per se, but the data from the 
prosopagnosic participant studied by Greve and Bauer (1990) suggests that affective 
attitude rather than familiarity may be the stronger influence on responses. As a 
general point, affective judgements do not appear to have been investigated in 
prosopagnosics: perhaps this would be a fruitful line for future research. Finally, the 
question of how structural information about faces is represented and accessed seems 
worthy of detailed investigation.  
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